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Prior to August 2009, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria witnessed widespread
violent conflicts between the government, multinational oil corporations
(MNCs) and militant groups. This conflict was widely attributed to deplorable
human security, which deprived the indigenes of the region access to their
sources of livelihoods due to pollution, by MNCs. In 2009, the government
granted amnesty to thousands of ‘repentant militants’ and this programme
has achieved mixed results. This article will explore the impact of human
security on the outbreak of violence in the Niger Delta and the impact of the
Amnesty Programme in addressing issues relating to human security. The
article concludes that bottom-up community-driven initiatives offer the best
approach to address human security issues in the Niger Delta. The article is
based on an ethnographic research carried out in 2013 in three states in the
region (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states).
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, one of the major areas in Africa affected by
violent conflict has been the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Home to
about 20 million Nigerians and located in West Africa’s oil-rich Gulf of
Guinea, the Niger Delta is strategic to the energy security calculations
of the world’s established and emerging powers.1 Although the oil
* Department of Politics, University of York, email: oaa511@york.ac.uk
1 Elias Courson, ’Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND):
Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta’ (Nordic
Africa Institute, Discussion Paper 47, 2009) <www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:280470/FULLTEXT01.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016.
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produced from the Niger Delta accounts for about 95 per cent of Nigeria’s
foreign exchange earnings and 80 per cent of federal government
revenues, incessant violence and disruption to oil exploration have
impeded development and human security in the region. Since the
discovery of oil in 1956, the region has experienced periods of unrest
and violent conflicts. Successive military and democratic governments
in the country have tried to find a lasting solution to the volatile situation
in the region.
The last attempt by the government to end the conflict was to
grant amnesty to ‘repentant militants’ and re-integrate them into the
communities through adequate training and provision of employment,
which invariably aims to improve their human security. However, an
ethnographic research carried out in the region in 2013 revealed that
the amnesty programme was flawed with issues relating to transparency
and accountability amongst others. Although the Amnesty Programme
reduced the conflict in the region, there has been a change of dynamics
in the conflict experienced in the region. The conflict has changed from
confrontations between militant groups and security forces to inter/
intra community conflicts while environmental degradation remains
an issue negatively impacting the livelihood and human security of the
people. These issues, coupled with rising unemployment, have resulted
in many young people seeking alternative livelihoods, which sometimes
are criminal and dangerous.
The aim of this article is not to repeat existing literature on the
causes of conflict in the Niger Delta, as several authors have researched
these extensively.2 On the contrary, this article seeks to explore why
the major conflict resolution initiatives in the region failed. The article
suggests that addressing human security concerns through bottom-up
development initiatives like adequate community governance remains
the most valuable strategy for conflict resolution and sustainable
2 See Joseph Richard, ‘Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria’
[1983] 21(3) Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 24; Renner
Michael, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the
New Age of Insecurity (New York: W W Norton 1996, 54); Ibrahim Elbadawi
and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?
Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict’ (2000) 9(3) Journal of African
Economy 247; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil
War’  (Oxford University, Centre for the Study of African Economic, 2002)
<www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/20-18text. pdf> accessed 25
January 2016; Augustine Ikelegbe, ‘Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger
Delta Region of Nigeria’ [2006] 5(1) African and Asian Studies 27.
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development in the region. After critically exploring the impact of human
security on the outbreak of conflict in the region, the article concludes
that community-driven initiatives based on accountability and
transparency offer the best solutions to peace and stability in the region.
This article is based on empirical evidence from an ethnographic
research carried out in the region in 2013 focusing on the three most
significant states regarding oil exploration and the outbreak of conflict
(Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states). The study involved 56 in-depth
interviews, group interviews, and participant observation over a three-
month period. The interviewees included government officials, MNC
staff, local indigenes from 18 communities, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups. Analysis of the interviews
was carried out using thematic template analysis.
The first section of the article will analyse the theoretical narratives
on the outbreak of conflict in the Niger Delta before critically exploring
the issues of human security and its impact on conflict in the region.
The second section explores the role of the government, MNCs and
indigenes of the Niger Delta in the conflict and subsequent human
security challenges in the region. The third section analyses the amnesty
granted repentant militants and the impact of the amnesty since
inception in 2009. The fourth section of the article critically examines
local community governance and the impact of transparency and
accountability in local communities and how this has entrenched peace
and economic development in communities with improved governance.
2.  HUMAN SECURITY AND THE
OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT
There are several variables that have resulted in the lack of development
and the resulting violent conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria,
which has impacted negatively on the Human Security of the people.
Some of these variables, which have been well researched, include
greed,3 grievance,4 predatory governments5 and prebenda-
3 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,  ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’
(2005) 49(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 626.
4 Thomas Homer-dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence (Princeton, N J:
Princeton University Press 1999, 47).
5 Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff, ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions
and Differential Paths to Growth Among New World Economies: A View from
Economic Historians in the United States’ in Stephen Haber (ed), How Latin
America Fell Behind Stanford (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997, 35).
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lism.6 Despite the significance of the region to the economy of Nigeria,
sporadic violence has made the region volatile, and several initiatives
designed to ameliorate the situation and enhance the human security
of the inhabitants have achieved limited success.
According to the 1994 Human Development Report, ‘Human Security
means that people can exercise their choices safely and freely – and
that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have
today are not totally lost tomorrow’.7 The report sees human security
from two different perspectives. First, safety from threats such as hunger,
disease and repression; second, protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in their homes, at
work or in the communities (freedom from fear and freedom from
want). The report states further that when people perceive a threat to
their lives, they often become intolerant – just like the case in the
Niger Delta region. In a similar vein, the Commission on Human
Security (CHS) defines human security as efforts to ‘protect the vital
core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and
human fulfilments’.8
The concept of human security is different from the human
development approach because it is centred on the security of
individuals as well as the threats they face, such as political repression,
identity and various forms of violence; while human development
focuses more on the State.9 The UNDP report categorized the threats
to human security into seven: economic security, food security, health
security, environmental security, personal security, community security,
and political security. One important thing to note about human security
is that threats are interlinked and interconnected, and individuals could
face more than one threat.10 In the view of MacFarlene and Khong,
‘human security is about the freedom from a threat to the core values
6 Joseph Richard, ‘Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria’ (1983)
21(3) Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 21.
7 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1994).
8 United Nations, ‘Human Security Now’ (Final Report of the Commission on
Human Security, 2003, 4) <www.un.org/humansecurity/content/human-
security-now> accessed 25 January 2016.
9 Tadjbakhsh Shahrbanou and AM Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and
Implications (London: Routledge 2007, 72).
10  ibid.
2016 HUMAN SECURITY IN THE NIGER DELTA 85
of human beings, including physical survival, welfare, and identity’.11
In the Niger Delta region, environmental pollution has impacted
negatively on the livelihoods of the people thereby affecting their human
security. The once fertile lands have been destroyed and the rivers,
which provided fish both for consumption and sales, have been polluted
through oil exploration activities, and this has impacted on the human
security of the people. In some cases, a symbiotic relationship between
government agencies and MNCs operating in the region has resulted
in a lack of adequate law enforcement, especially in regards to
environmental laws.
Most social science research into the cause of violent conflicts,
especially the popular greed-versus-grievance debate, focus on the
structural conditions that increase the risk of conflict rather than the
decisions of actors to engage in violent acts. In most cases, these
structural conditions are based on the analysis of States and other
institutions rather than the concern and needs of individuals.12
Previously, issues of human security and violent conflict are treated as
separate entities in research, but these two are interrelated. The greed
theory is one of the most important theories relating the presence of
natural resources to violent conflict. Collier and Hoeffler argued that
countries possessing natural resources have more likelihood of
experiencing violent conflict arguing further that one of the main factors
in any such conflict is greed.13
It is important to state that although greed might have surfaced
during the crises in the Niger Delta, it was not the initial basis for the
11 Neil Macfarlane and Yuen Foong khong, Human Security and the UN A Critical
History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2006, 143).
12 See Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of
Literature’ (1998) 35(3) Journal of Peace Research 388; Alex Bellamy and
Matt Mcdonald, ‘“The Utility of Human Security”: Which Humans? What
Security? A reply to Thomas & Tow’ [2002] 33(3) Security Dialogue 373;
Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Enduring Disorder and Persistent Poverty: A Review of
Linkages Between War and Chronic Poverty ’  [2003]  31(3)  World
Development 629; C. Cramer, ‘Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological
Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War’
[2002] 30(11) World Development 1845.
13 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’ (Oxford
University, Centre for the study of African Economic, 2000) <www.csae.ox.ac.uk/
workingpapers/pdfs/20-18text.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016; Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler,  ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’ [2005]
49(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 635.
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agitation by the people of the region. Although there were incidences
of greed perpetuated by some of the advocates in the struggle for
resource control, there was a genuine situation of neglect that led to
the grievance. Shahrbanou and Chenoy suggest that ‘the greed analysis
of conflict would plausibly dismiss movements and struggles based on
genuine grievances of people that arise out of oppression and violation
of rights, which may be morally justified.14 They also noted that the
greed theory does not adequately point to issues such as the violation
of rights, the building of stereotypes and the biased nature of states in
dealing with sensitive inter-community matters, especially on issues
relating to natural resources. This article focuses on the Niger Delta
region’s environmental security because it embodies all the other
human security issues experienced there.
In many conflicts, the armed groups consist of young men who are
frustrated by the contractions in their livelihoods eroding the
opportunity of living a better life mostly due to actions that are not
perceived to be their faults.15 According to Ohlsson, ‘the common
denominator of many, if not most, of the civil wars and conflicts which
plagued Africa, South Asia, and Latin America during the last decade is
poverty resulting from loss of livelihoods which, in turn, is often caused
or exacerbated by environmental degradation’.16 De Soysa et al, explain
further that declining access to land as well as a reduction in the returns
from the human use of land is a key process that causes livelihood
contraction; hence, increasing the risk that people will join armed
groups.17 In the view of Scheper-Hughes,18 the decision of a young man
to join an armed gang may be as a result of genuine grievance,
frustration, and a desire for revenge, or by identification with a common
14 Shahrbanou and Chenoy (n 9).
15 Leif Ohlsson, ‘Livelihood Conflicts: Linking poverty and environment as causes
of conflict’ (Stockholm: Environmental Policy unit, Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency, 2000) <www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/david.harvey/
AEF806/OhlssonLivelihoods.pdf> accessed 26 January 2016.
16 ibid 3.
17 Indra De soysa, Nils Gleditsch, Michael Gibson and Margareta Sollenberg, ‘To
cultivate peace: Agriculture in a world of conflict’ (Wilson Centre-Environmental
Change and Security Project Report 5:15-25, 1999) <www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/feature2.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016.
18 Nancy Scheper-hughes, ‘Violence in war and peace: An anthology’ in Nancy
Scheper-hughes and Philippe Bourgois (eds), Who’s the killer? Popular Justice
and Human Rights in a South African squatter camp (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)
61.
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cause, a need for protection from violence, and poverty caused by a
denial of economic freedoms.19 In the Niger Delta region, environmental
degradation, coupled with the dearth of an alternative source of
livelihood has resulted in unemployment and underemployment in
the Niger Delta. Furthermore, poor governance, especially at the
community and local government levels, has robbed the region of much
needed development.20 All these indicate the importance of exploring
the perspective of the outbreak of conflict from the lens of human
security.
On environmental degradation, the extent and nature of the stresses
that people face are determined by the level of dependence on natural
resources and ecosystem services as well as the people’s capacity to
adapt to the changes in these resources.21 This indicates that when
people directly depend on natural resources for their livelihood, they
face immediate risk if there is a change in the balance of these resources.
In the Niger Delta region, the traditional occupation of the male
inhabitants was farming and fishing while the women engaged in food
processing and marketing. The loss of livelihood impacted on the human
security of the people, especially the youths which has led to the
grievance and a repeated cycle of widespread protests which are ‘crushed’
by the government resulting in the youths arming themselves to either
attack security forces or oil installations. This interplay between
environmental degradation, human security and violent conflicts in
the Niger Delta is worth exploring further.
3.  HUMAN SECURITY: GOVERNMENT, MNCs
AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Many studies have heaped the blame for the conflict in the Niger Delta
on the Nigerian government and MNCs operating in the region.
According to World Organization against Torture (OMCT), in the first
19 Musifiky Mwanasali, ‘The view from below’ in Mats Berdal and David
Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner 2000, 137).
20 United Nations Development Progamme, Niger Delta Human Development Report
(UNDP Nigeria, 2006).
21 Jon Barnett and W. Adger, ‘Environmental change, human security, and violent
conflict’ in  Global Environmental Change and Human Security (MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts 2010) 4.
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three years of Nigeria returning to democracy after 1999, over 50
incidences of conflict were recorded resulting in the death of more
than 10,000 Nigerians. Several hundreds of thousands of people were
reportedly displaced as a result of the violence.22 The report stated
further that security agents carried out most of the killings with orders
from the government. The role of the State in fuelling violence in the
country includes: (1) The inability of the government to bring the
perpetrators of the violence to book often because, in most cases, the
people responsible for these acts are either top government officials or
people that help the government win elections (political godfathers);
(2) State sponsored vengeful attacks by soldiers after attacks on security
forces, examples include the Odi massacre which resulted in the death
of 2,483 people23 and the Baga massacre where 228 people were killed;
(3) Collusion of government officers either by taking sides or simply
refusing to act; for example, there was an allegation against a former
defence minister during the Tiv/Jukun crises that he aided the Jukuns
by supplying them with military uniforms and weapons because they
were his kinsmen; (4) Reckless territorial demarcation and the
allocation of local governments without consultation and based on
political manipulations. As exemplified in the Warri crises of 1997,
governments create conflict by manipulating the people’s ethnic
sensibilities and political authority.24
Furthermore, the Nigerian state often condones militant activities.
The three major ethnic groups comprising 50 per cent of the population
have ethnic pseudo-militias they identify with, such as Arewa (Hausa-
Fulani), Bakassi boys (Igbo), Oodua People’s Congress (Yoruba) and
22 World organization against torture, ‘Hope Betrayed: A report on Impunity and
State Sponsored Violence in Nigeria’ (OMCT, 2002) <www.omct.org/files/
2002/09/1231/nigeriareport0802.pdf> accessed 27 January 2016.
23 Environmental rights action, ‘A Blanket of Silence, Images of the Odi
Genocide ’  (Environmental Rights Action (Friends of the Earth)
2002) <www.eraction.org/publications/silence.pdf> accessed 25 January
2016.
24 Leton Marcus, ‘Oil and the Urban Question: Fuelling Violence and Politics in
Warri, Niger Delta’ (Economies of Violence, Working Paper 8, Berkeley University,
2006) 10 <http://geog.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/
NigerDelta/WP/8-Leton.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016; Victor Ojakorotu
and Ufo Okeke-uzodike, ‘Oil, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Niger Delta
of Nigeria’ (2006) 6(2) African Journal on Conflict Resolution 85.
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the Consultative Forum.25 The perceived injustice felt by the ethnic
minority groups especially those from the Niger Delta, coupled with
their feeling of marginalization despite producing most of the country’s
resources is partly responsible for the formation of their own militant
groups which are also formed along ethnic identities to ‘defend their
rights’.26 The complacency of the Nigerian state in this regard is the
failure to curtail the creation of these groups. In an interview, an ex-
militant said since government failed to curtail the activities of the
militias representing the bigger ethnic groups, it has no justification to
proscribe those in the Niger Delta. The respondent also rejected the
term ‘militia’ but argued that they are ‘freedom fighters’ and27 many of
the region’s clashes are between these rival ethnic militias. Guichaoua
described the militias in Nigeria as insurgent groups mostly defending
causes ‘aligned with ethnic interests’.28
The advent of democracy in Nigeria brought little succour. The
militias in Nigeria are entrenched in the electoral system being used
by politicians to advance selfish ambitions by intimidating voters and
harassing political opponents,29 which explain the ruling elites’
reluctance to prohibit the groups. Newsom observes that the cycle of
violent conflict in the Niger-Delta has been tied to elections30 evidenced
by the increase in violence shortly before and after elections, especially
the 2003 and 2007 elections. Shortly before these elections, some
politicians in Nigeria imported large quantities of arms and
ammunitions.31 Young people, who are mostly jobless, are then
25 Yvan Guichaoua, ‘How Do Ethnic Militias Perpetuate in Nigeria? A Micro-level
Perspective on the Oodua People’s Congress’ (2010) 38(11) World
Development 1664.
26 ibid 7.
27 Interview in Rivers state, September 2013.
28 ibid.
29. Human rights watch, Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence
(Washington: Human Rights Watch 2003a, 11); Human rights watch, Criminal
Politics: Violence, ‘Godfathers’ and Corruption in Nigeria ( Washington: Human
Rights Watch 2007, 33)
30 Chris Newsom, ‘Conflict in the Niger Delta, More than a Local Affair’ (United
States Institute of Peace special report 217, 2011, 1) <www.usip.org/files/
resources/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf> accessed 26 January 2016.
31 Ebere Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind Dart, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Electoral
Violence in Nigeria’ (2010, 4) United States Institute of Peace <http://
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR263-Breaking_the_Cycle_of_
Electoral_Violence_in_Nigeria.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016.
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recruited to intimidate voters and rig elections. The politicians who
are unable to retrieve the weapons from them then discard them after
the elections. Subsequently, they form their own militant groups and
begin to bomb economic infrastructure to gain significance after which
they move on to hostage taking and kidnapping using these same
weapons.32
Another complicit actor is the MNCs operating in the region accused
of negligence resulting in environmental pollution in the region. The
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has carried out the
most comprehensive analysis of the extent of pollution in the Niger
Delta in 2011. Both local and international experts who surveyed 122km
of pipelines, 4,000 samples of soil and water from different areas and
sources, 5000 medical records and held 264 meetings attended by
over 23,000 people in the region carried out the project.33 Although
most of the MNCs claim that they operate at the highest standards in
Nigeria and that international practices are observed during their
operations, the report proved otherwise. The UNEP report blamed the
MNCs for negligence and oil pollution in the region.
 Furthermore, the system of compensation used by the MNCs for
lands used for oil exploration referred to as ‘operation techniques’ by
staff but often labelled as ‘divide and rule’ by the communities
sometimes results in violent conflicts and several respondents
(including senior MNC and government officials) agreed. Also, MNC
staff historically introduced pipeline vandalization. A senior government
official explained that in the 1980s, Shell had some workers called
‘damage clerks’ whose responsibility was to travel round the operations
areas of Shell and report leaks or pipeline damages. The damage clerks
were also responsible for evaluating the extent of damage to farmlands
and process farmers’ claims. After sometime, the damage clerks began
to teach locals how to identify pipelines for vandalization in order to
make claims, thus starting a trend.
32 Chris Newsom, ‘Conflict in the Niger Delta: More than a Local Affair’ (2011)
United States Institute of Peace’ <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
resources/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016.
33 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)’ Environmental Assessment
of Ogoniland Report (2011, 6). Available at <www.unep.org/disasters
andconflicts/CountryOperations/Nigeria/EnvironmentalAssessmentof
Ogonilandreport/tabid/54419/Default.aspx> accessed 13 March 2016.
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On the other hand, several indigenes of the region are equally
complicit. Some youths in the region have used the excuse of lack of
adequate employment to engage in oil bunkering and pipeline
vandalization. This has further impacted on the environment, impeding
the human security of the inhabitants of the region.
Figure 1: Oil Production and Pipeline Vandalization in the Niger Delta
Source: Nigeria National Petroleum Commission Database)
Figure 1 shows the number of pipelines vandalized since 1999. It
is important to note that pipeline vandalism reduced drastically in
2010 (a year after the start of the Amnesty Programme) but spiralled
again the following year. A new trend of vandalism in the region
emerged recently, which I term ‘Vandalization for Attention’. In several
communities I visited in 2013, many youths attested to participating
in pipeline vandalism not because they are interested in siphoning
crude oil for sale but to attract the attention of the MNCs and invite
them for dialogue. They argued that it is a ‘potent weapon’ as the
MNCs only respond when their production is disrupted, implying that the
environment is further and deliberately polluted by a segment of the victims.
And human insecurities increases while youths rival youths engaged in oil
bunkering clash and have confrontations with security forces.
4.  AMNESTY FOR ‘REPENTANT MILITANTS:
THE WAY FORWARD?
In 2008, the government set up a Technical Committee on the
Resolution of Niger Delta Crises (TCRND). The purpose of the
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committee was to study the recommendations of previous commissions
and make recommendations on how to achieve sustainable
development, peace as well as human and environmental security in
the region. Previous commissions included the Sir Henry Willinks
Commission Report on the Fears of the Minorities (1958); General
Alexander Ogomudia’s Special Security Committee Report on Oil
Producing Areas (2001); and the Report of the National Political Reform
Conference (2005) among others.34 The TCRND, made up of 44
members with ‘extensive knowledge’ of the Niger Delta, came up with
several recommendations, including increasing the revenue allocation
to 25 per cent in the interim and later to 50 per cent (the allocation
stands at 13 per cent at time of writing); establishment of a
Disarmament, Decommission and Reintegration (DDR) Commission
which will address the challenge of arms and militancy; negotiate
amnesty for all Niger Delta militants; end gas flaring by December
2008; generate 5,000MW of power for the Region by 2010, and ensure
significant improvement in education, health and youth employment
in the region.35
Of all the recommendations of the technical committee, the federal
government only pursued two: amnesty for militants and the
establishment of a DDR Commission to pave the way for the amnesty
process.36 In August 2009, the government granted an amnesty deal to
20,192 registered militants with an initial budget of N52 billion
(US$145 million).37 Between July and August 2009, thousands of the
repentant militants surrendered thousands of weapons, including
gunboats, automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, ammunitions,
bulletproof vests, etc.38 However, the militants did not surrender their
entire arsenal because of the lack of trust in the government and the
Amnesty Programme. An ex-militant interviewed stated that many of
34 SDN, ‘The Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta’ (Stakeholder
Democracy Network, 2008, 14) <www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/
Other%20publications/Nigeriareport.pdf> accessed 25 March 2014.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 Daniel Agbiboa, ‘Have we heard the last? Oil, environmental insecurity, and
the impact of the amnesty programme on the Niger Delta resistance
movement’ (2013) 40(137) Review of African Political Economy 454.
38 Peterside Joab, ‘State and Fallacy of Rehabilitation of Repentant Militants’ in
Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Analysis of First Phase of the Federal Government’s
Amnesty Program’ (2010) 11(4) Pan African Social Science Review 69.
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the militant groups did not trust the government to deliver on their
promises based on previously broken accords and feared that the
government could militarize the region again afterwards.39
Furthermore, the Amnesty Programme has been described as a
sham, not intended for the development of the Niger Delta but to stop
the militants from fighting and destroying oil infrastructure, which
cripples oil exploration.40 The region remains underdeveloped; oil
pollution and gas flaring have continued and the poverty rate is very
high. Despite the TCRND recommendation that all gas flaring activities
must end by December 2008, there were still dozens of visible gas
flaring activities taking place in 2013. A Project Officer of Environmental
Rights Action stated during an interview that oil pollution as a result
of equipment failure remains prevalent in the region. In 2007, Al Jazeera
correspondents visited some communities in the Niger Delta and
reported the prevalent poverty and environmental degradation in the
region. Eight years after (2015), the same communities were visited
again, and the report confirmed that nothing has changed and bunkering
has increased in some of the communities.41
Reviewing the TCRND recommendations show that several are yet
to be implemented. The Amnesty Programme, adopted as a ‘quick fix’,
has succeeded to an extent in reducing the conflict in the region and
allowed the MNCs to increase productivity. It is arguable that the
reduction in pipeline vandalization (Figure 1) in 2010 was a direct
response to the adoption of the Amnesty Programme. A surge in pipeline
vandalism in 2011 shows that the menace is on the rise again, and in-
depth interviews in the three case study states revealed that the
Amnesty Programme succeeded in solving the short-term problem of
confrontations between militants and security forces but shifted the
attention of the youths to other vices such as oil bunkering and
vandalization for attention.
The Amnesty Programme failed to consider women, children and
the elderly who also bear the brunt of human insecurity in the region
while a large percentage of the youths trained as part of the Amnesty
Programme remain unemployed and deep rooted issues such as
39 Interview in Bayelsa, September 2013.
40 Daniel Agbiboa (n 37).
41 Al Jazeera, ‘Poverty Persists in The Niger Delta’ (2015) <http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/ 2015/03/nigeria-poverty-niger-delta-
150305014819233.html> accessed 13 March 2016.
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marginalization and environmental degradation remain unaddressed.42
The survival of the State has been prioritized ahead of its citizen’s
survival,43 and the Nigerian state has prioritized oil production in the
Niger Delta at the expense of the people.
5.  THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Although several studies44 portray the Nigerian government and the
MNCs as the culprits while the indigenes of the local communities as
victims, it is important to state that the indigenes are also culpable.
With actions ranging from vandalization for attention, to kidnapping
and harassment of oil workers, it is clear that local communities are
part of the crises. One major reason for the volatile nature of the region
is the breakdown of community structures, especially regarding
leadership. The 2009 amnesty created a change in dynamics in the
conflict shifting the interplay of the conflict from security forces versus
local communities/militants to inter/intra community conflict.
 Most of the conflicts now experienced in the region have been as
a result of lack of accountability of community leaders; community
leadership tussles and clashes among youths involved in oil bunkering.
There have been cases where community leaders embezzled funds
meant for community projects leading to clashes between the
supporters of such leaders and their opponents. Many youth
organisations looked inward and realized that the governance of the
distribution of the resources is a major problem.45 To address the
42 Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi, ‘Post Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta: Challenges
and Prospects’ African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
(ACCORD) 2011; Moses Ikoh and Ebebe Ukpong, ‘The Niger Delta Crises:
Taming Violence Beyond the Amnesty’ 2013 (3)7, International Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences 152.
43 David Bosold, ‘Development of the human security field’ in David Chandler
and Nik Hynek (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Security (Abingdon:
Routledge 2011) 36.
44 Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, ‘Where Vultures feast: Shell, Human Rights and
Oil’, (2003) London, Verso.
45 Darlington Ashamole, ‘Youth, Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict:
Investigating the Crisis between Niger Delta Youth and Elders from Gender
Perspective’ (PhD thesis submitted to the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom,
2014).
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problem, the youths have engaged in several vicious attacks against
their leaders leading to the death of many elders in the region.46 A
community leader interviewed in Bayelsa State stated that ‘although
we blame the government and MNCs for our woes, sometimes we are
the architects of our own misfortune. The leaders have been corrupted
and, in several cases, they steal the little resources that accrue to the
community. Such leaders have turned themselves into godfathers using
our children against us and creating division in the communities’.47 In
order to curtail this trend of inter/intra community conflicts caused by
inadequate governance at the community level, some of the MNCs
operating in the region embarked on initiatives to improve transparency
and accountability as well as enhance the governance of the distribution
of resources in local communities. This section will explore two of
such initiatives and their impact in boosting domestic economic
transformations in several communities in the Niger Delta.
6. COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH: THE AKASSA MODEL
The perceived failure of the development approach in use, coupled
with an increase in oil- related violence led to the development of a
different model of resource distribution by Statoil piloted in 1997 across
19 communities where the company operates.48 The new community
development model involved all the 19 communities contributing to
the drafting of a development plan, which was submitted to Statoil for
implementation. The first stage was the merging of all existing
community development groups such as the council of elders, the
women groups, and the youth groups to form a single community
development group called Akassa Development Foundation (ADF).
Every year, the ADF designs a community development plan, which is
entirely funded by Statoil. The plan is based on consultation from
several organizations within the participating communities. A
distinguishing aspect of the model is that community members suggest
projects.
46 ibid.
47 Interview in Bayelsa state, September 2013.
48 Statoil, ‘Akassa Model Website’ (Statoil Local Value, 2014)  <www.statoil.com/
en/Environment Society/Sustainability/Pages/LocalValue.aspx> accessed 27
January 2016.
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The model is entirely bottom-up with the ADF involved at every
stage of the development of the model. An evaluation of the model in
2014 by Kimenyi et al. suggests that the Akassa model is a successful
community development model due to three main reasons. First,
community members are involved in project design and implementa-
tion, second, the community members are involved in setting the goals
of the ADF and, third, community members are involved in discussing
and approving the rules of the projects with little or no interference.49
Furthermore, Kimenyi et al. explained that the model exhibits good
community governance through transparency and accountability and
this has positively impacted on the human security of the people living
in these communities. There are provisions of basic infrastructure such
as water, electricity and health centres and many of the youths have
been empowered, through the initiatives developed by the model. In
addition to these, the model consists of an excellent conflict resolution
mechanism, which has helped in resolving disputes between the
communities. Available data from the NNPC indicate that there is a
low prevalence of pipeline vandalization in the Akassa communities.
This analysis indicates that the Akassa model has considerably
addressed issues relating to human security in the communities
involved.
Although the Akassa model has been described as an efficient
bottom-up community-driven resource distribution model in the Niger
Delta, the replication of the model is debatable for three main reasons.
First, the model is used in only 19 communities in the Niger Delta.
Considering that there are over 3000 communities in the region, it is
difficult to see how the model can be replicated. Second, all the
communities are located offshore. Hence, it is important to consider a
model that can also be applicable onshore. Third, Statoil is a relatively
small company with less than two per cent of the total oil production
in the Niger Delta. Despite these issues, the bottom-up approach to
development used by Statoil has yielded positive dividends.
49 Mwangi Kimenyi and others, Analysis of Community-Driven Development in
Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: Use of the Institutional Analysis and Development
(Iad) Framework (African Growth Initiative: Brookings 2014, 22); Uwafiokun
Idemudia, ‘Oil extraction and poverty reduction in the Niger Delta: A critical
examination of partnership initiatives’ (2009) 90(4) Journal of Business
Ethics 91; Olubayo Oluduro and Olubisi Oluduro, ‘Nigeria: In search of
sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme’
(2012) 5(7) Journal of Sustainable Development, 52.
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7.  CHEVRON GLOBAL MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING (GMOU) MODEL
According to Haider, to develop a holistic approach to peace building
in a region ravaged by violent conflict, it is important to address both
the tangible and intangible effects of the conflict.50 The tangible effects
are the visible aspects of the conflict such as environmental insecurity,
and destruction to infrastructure, the people killed or wounded during
the conflicts as well as disruption to the sources of livelihoods of the
people. The intangible aspect includes the collapse of community
structure, the fear and trauma experienced by the people during the
crises, lack of trust in government, state institutions and the MNCs, as
well as the psychological effects associated with the loss of livelihoods.
In any conflict situation, violence transforms both the social and
political foundations of the community, and this makes it imperative
to develop a ‘community-oriented analytical approach’, which should
help understand how communities re-emerge and organize despite the
challenges involved.51
In many of the peace initiatives set up either by the government or
the MNCs, the communities are often left behind and when the
communities are involved, it is limited to a few influential people or
godfathers who mostly do not have the interest of the populace in
mind.52 Furthermore, development initiatives often go through third
parties and not directly to the communities. An increase in awareness
in the local communities coupled with the emergence of several youth
groups has made it increasingly difficult for a few influential people or
the so-called godfathers to maintain a grip on the increasingly volatile
communities.53 This implies that any peace process to be initiated must
involve the full acceptance of all the stakeholders, especially the
community members. Such peace process must also go directly to the
50 Huma Haider, ‘Community based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict
affected and Fragile Contexts’ (Governance and Social Development Resource
Centre (GSDRC), 2009) <www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/eirs8.pdf> accessed 27
January 2016.
51 Béatrice Pouligny, ‘Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities
of International Programmes Aimed at Building “New” Societies’ (2005)
36(4) Security Dialogue 499.
52 Interview with Environmental Rights Action project officer Delta state, August
2013.
53 Ashamole (n 45) 126.
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communities involved with little or no interference from third parties.
Given this, Chevron, together with some NGOs, developed a new
sustainable approach to development in 2005 for use in all its areas of
operation. Called the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU),
this model gives the communities greater roles in determining how
and what should be done regarding their development. The company
decided to change its resource distribution method by dealing with
the communities directly through committees selected by the
community members. The main objective of the initiative was to ensure
peace and stability in the areas, as well as, understand the agitations
of the people and try to find solutions to them.54
The GMOU model was designed to address most of the challenges
faced by Chevron while operating in the communities. The model that
was only used in Nigeria by Chevron (at the time of writing – 2016) is
a bottom-up approach where the communities are given the privilege
of deciding the projects to be done in their communities based on the
needs of the people. Before the GMOU process, the oil companies hired
development experts to analyse the situation in each community and
send the analysis to the company’s community development units
(CDU). The CDU, in conjunction with some influential members of
the communities, then designed the projects which were often carried
out by selected community members (often the godfathers)55 or
companies owned by friends of the CDU members which were not
even affiliated with the communities.
The GMOU process was rolled out in 2006, but it was not fully
operational until 2009, a period that coincided with the start of the
Amnesty Programme. Although the effect of the amnesty on the model
is not entirely clear, a senior manager interviewed at Chevron in August
2013 stated that the Amnesty Programme made it easier to roll out
the project in more communities. The GMOU is a shift from patronage-
based to technocratic means of community development based on a
bottom-up approach. The process is clear and transparent and although
it is still undergoing a ‘refining’ stage and the process can be improved
54 Chevron, ‘Nigeria: In the community’ (Chevron Nigeria, 2014)
<www.chevron.com/countries/nigeria/inthecommunity/> accessed 27
January 2016.
55 ‘Godfather’ is a term used for influential people in the community who often
use force or violence to achieve their aims and are sometimes perceived to be
above the law.
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significantly, it has been commended by many of the stakeholders in
the region as the most impactful as far as community development is
concerned.56
The model’s first significant change is in the governance structure
of the communities. All the communities where Chevron operates were
divided into eight regional development councils (RDCs), which are
along ethnic lines. The represented communities elect the
representatives of each RDC, and this limits the agitation for leadership
in the communities. Second, there is transparency in the allocation of
resources by Chevron, which is then replicated by a transparent bidding
process for contracts awarded in the communities. Third, there is
accountability at every stage of the process. Chevron pays directly into
selected banks, which act as trustees for the funds. The bank release
funds to contractors in trenches only after all the parties agree that the
previous allocation has been judiciously spent. There are representatives
of Chevron, NGOs, government, banks and local communities in the
governing council of the Community Engagement Management Board
(CEMB) – the body created to supervise all the eight RDCs.
In all, 16 out of 20 respondents from communities in Chevron’s
operational areas expressed satisfaction with the standard of
governance, accountability and transparency in the new GMOU model.
Most of the respondents agreed that the model had reduced violent
agitations in the communities thereby boosting local economy while
greatly reducing the influence of godfathers and creating employment
through the use of indigenous contractors. One of the managers
interviewed in September 2013 stated that Chevron had witnessed
significantly reduced disruption in its areas of operations. There is a
peace and reconciliation committee in each RDC and communities that
record zero pipeline vandalization are given an annual bonus.
Furthermore, analysis of NNPC data on pipeline vandalization reveals
that there has been a reduction in pipeline vandalization in communities
where Chevron has implemented the GMOU model. Some of the visible
projects completed in the RDCs visited include community health
centres, primary and secondary schools and skills acquisition centres.
Some of the RDCs also have soft loans for people interested in setting
up small- and medium-scale businesses. This model has invariably
positively impacted on the human security of the communities where
Chevron operates.
56 Interview with stakeholders in the Niger Delta, August 2013.
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8.  COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
It is evident that the Nigerian government and the MNCs have made
some attempts to develop the Niger Delta and reduce the conflict that
has ravaged the region. The question is how appropriate these initiatives
are in addressing the challenges faced by this region. Following the
recommendations made by the TCRND, the resulting disarmament and
amnesty granted to repentant militants, without the implementation
of the other recommendations show that the government is interested
only in short-term measures neglecting the long-standing issues.
Furthermore, development agencies created for the improvement of
the region have failed due to issues relating to corruption and lack of
adequate funding.57
In addition, there are several legal loopholes about development,
oil exploration, and environmental pollution. There is a need for an
overhaul of the laws governing oil exploration and community
development as well as the structures for law enforcement.58 Despite
government’s enactment of several laws to prohibit environmental
degradation and adherence to best practices, there are inadequate
facilities for law enforcement. The implication of this is that the MNCs
sometimes operate with impunity and utter disregard for the
environment.
It is the responsibility of the Nigerian government to promote and
protect the economy of the Niger Delta as well as provide amenities
that will enhance the development of the region, thereby enhancing
the human security of the people. To promote and protect the economy
of the region, Ogbonnaya argues that existing laws and loopholes in
the region must be reviewed. Although there are laws governing issues
such as oil exploration activities, environmental degradation,
compensation for lands used for exploration as well as other exploration
and distribution activities, there is no adequate legal framework for
either community development or conflict resolution and law
enforcement in the region.
57 Shola Omotola, ‘From the OMPADEC to NDDC: an Assessment of State Responses
to Environmental Insecurities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2007) 54, Africa
Today 582.
58 Ufiem Ognonnaya, ‘Environmental Law and Underdevelopment in the Niger
Delta Region of Nigeria, [2011] 5(5) African Research Review, 74.
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The three categories of respondents (the government, MNCs and
indigenes of oil producing communities) agreed that the lack of an
adequate legal structure for the distribution of resources as well as
community development creates confusion in the region. The MNCs
use their discretion to implement an ‘adequate’ level of community
development, but there is no law that dictates what is adequate. As
promising as the Statoil and GMOU models look, the lack of legal
obligations makes the future of such models bleak. Although the
Petroleum Industries Bill (PIB) proposes an establishment of Petroleum
Host Community Fund ‘PHC Fund’ which should be used for the
development of oil producing areas,59 the experience of the inadequacies
of previous development agencies and funds show that without a
clearly spelt out legal understanding of such initiatives, there is little
chance of any success.
To achieve sustainable development in the Niger Delta, there are
certain structures that must be put in place. First, any development
approach must focus not only on short-term initiatives but also on the
long-term issues and include all segments of the communities (not
limited to the youths). Second, development approaches must be
bottom-up with active participation and involvement of the community
members. The Akassa and GMOU models show that such strategies
would yield more positive results. Third, there is a need to overhaul
the legal framework governing oil exploration, community development,
and environmental degradation as well as create greater access to
justice by empowering magistrate courts which are closer to the people.
Furthermore, clear structures for law enforcement are necessary to
achieve sustainable development and human security.
9.  CONCLUSION
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has experienced several challenges
that have impacted negatively on the human security of inhabitants of
the region. Nseabasi argues that environmental issues such as pollution
and destruction of farmlands and fishponds which serve as the sources
of livelihood of people can result in stress that impact on the human
59 NNPC, ‘The Petroleum Industry Bill’ Nigeria National Petroleum Commission,
< http://www.nnpcgroup. com/PetroleumIndustryBill.aspx> Accessed 17
March 2016.
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security of the people and often leads to rebellion.60 This is the case in
the Niger Delta where rebellion through riots and protests has
metamorphosed into the formation of militant groups. Poverty, lack of
basic infrastructure and underdevelopment are some of the factors that
have led to grievances and also serve as a justification for young men
in this region to join militant groups. The feeling of marginalization
coupled with the notion that the only ‘language’ authorities understand
is violence also fuels the insurgencies experienced in this region.
Some previous studies carried out in the region have solely put
the blame of the conflict on the Nigerian State and the MNCs operating
in the region. This article, however, has shown that the indigenes of
the Niger Delta are also culpable in the conflict. Trends in environmental
degradation such as destruction of oil installations as a panacea to
dialogue with the MNCs, including the recent blowing up of pipelines
to protest the trial of an ex-militant leader (Government Ekpemupolo-
Tompolo), provide further evidence of their culpability.61 Issues, such
as a breakdown in local community governance, lack of transparency
and accountability has shifted the dynamics of the conflict since the
inception of the Amnesty Programme. There are fewer confrontations
between security forces and communities/militants but more inter/
intra community violence based on issues relating to the distribution
of resources.
The youth-focused Amnesty Programme has succeeded to some
extent in reducing violent confrontations with security forces. However,
the problems of inter/intra community violence, oil bunkering, and
pipeline vandalization have been on the increase. Some MNCs have
also changed their development approaches and started playing
significant roles in the organization of community structures in their
areas of operation. Such examples are the case studies of Statoil and
Chevron who have developed structures to improve the governance of
distribution of resources, thereby reducing conflicts. Despite the success
60 Akpan Nseabasi, ‘Governance and Communal Conflicts in a Post-democratic
Nigeria: A Case of the Oil-producing Niger Delta Region’ (2010) 2(3) Journal
of African Studies and Development, 70.
61 Sahara reporters, ’Ex-Militant Leader Fingers Tompolo And Shoot At Sight In
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of these programmes, the lack of an adequate legal framework to aid
such initiatives and the inability of the government to set a defined
structure for the development of the region pose a threat to the future
of the region as well as the human security of the people.
Although these structures have been adjudged to increase
accountability and transparency in such communities, a possible
implication of these structures is that it can further reduce the legitimacy
of the local governments in the region as the MNCs take on more visible
and direct roles in improving the human security of the communities.
To achieve sustainable development in the Niger Delta region, there is
a need for all the stakeholders involved such as the government, MNCs,
indigenes and NGOs operating in the region to agree on a proper bottom-
up development framework involving the full participation of the
indigenes and backed up with a strong legal framework. Furthermore,
there is a need to focus on long-term development initiatives that would
ensure a secured future for the children in the region. This makes it
imperative to increase funding for education and apprenticeships with
an emphasis on opportunities in the non-oil sector.
